In this article, I discuss three methods of decomposing the elasticity of own-good demand. One of the methods, the decision-based decomposition (Gupta, 1988) , is useful in determining the influence of changes in consumers' decisions on the growth in owngood demand. The other two methods, the unit-based decomposition (van Heerde et al., 2003 ) and the share-based decomposition (Berndt et al., 1997) , are useful in determining whether the growth in own-good demand has been stolen from competing goods.
I. Introduction
Three methods of decomposing the elasticity of demand have been used to study whether marketing actions expand the market or steal business from rival firms. These decompositions, when applied to the same problem, produce seemingly contradictory results. One method, for example, may suggest that all of the demand created by an incremental advertising investment would be generated by market expansion while another suggests the same increase would be stolen from rival firms. I will explain why these apparently contradictory results actually are complementary and provide a more comprehensive understanding of the investment's impact.
Consider the following example. Suppose two firms are competing in a market.
Firm A is considering whether to increase its advertising investments by a small amount.
The unit sales and market shares that would be earned by the firms at the two investment levels are summarized in Table One . Firm A would like to know whether the growth in its demand comes at the expense of Firm B.
< Insert Table One >
Several methods have been developed to answer this question. The crucial difference among them lies in how the researchers measure stolen business. Some authors measure stolen business by the decrease in demand for competing goods (van Heerde et al., 2003; van Heerde et al., 2004) . I will refer to these methods as unit-based decompositions. In our example, these authors would claim that none of the growth in Firm A's demand would come at the expense of Firm B because Firm B's demand would not be affected by the advertising investment. This is a reasonable point of view to take.
Other authors measure stolen business by the decrease in market share of competing goods (Berndt et al., 1995; Berndt et al., 1997; Rosenthal et al., 2003) . I will refer to these methods as share-based decompositions. In our example, these authors would claim that some of the growth in Firm A's demand would come at the expense of Firm B because Firm B's market share would drop by 1.3 percentage points due to the advertising investment. This too is a reasonable point of view to take.
Despite appearing to offer very similar measures of stolen business, the unit-and share-based methods can produce strikingly different results. In our example, the unitbased measure suggests that none of the growth in Firm A's demand would come at the expense of Firm B, but the share-based measure suggests that two-thirds of it would.
Firm B would need to earn 1,020 units in the expanded market in order to maintain its original market share. Since it earns only 1,000 units, the share-based measure classifies 20 units of the 30 unit increase as being stolen from it.
Not only do these decompositions give very different impressions of what is
happening in the marketplace, the share-based method has not been fully understood. Berndt et al. (1997) write:
We distinguish between two types of marketing: (1) that which concentrates on bringing new customers into the market ("[market]-expanding" advertising), and (2) that which concentrates on competing for market shares from these consumers ("rivalrous" advertising).
This interpretation is misleading. Share-based decompositions classify only a portion of the market expansion as being primary (or non-rivalrous) demand. In our example, the share-based decomposition classifies only 10 units of the 30 unit increase in market demand as primary. By contrast, the unit-based measure defines primary demand to be equivalent to the market expansion, the full 30 unit increase.
A third set of authors study a marketing action's impact from an entirely different perspective. They measure the influence of changes in the consumers' decisions on the growth in own-good demand (Gupta, 1988; Chiang, 1991; Chintagunta, 1993; Bucklin et al., 1999; and Bell et al., 1999) . I will refer to these as decision-based decompositions.
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These decompositions, contrary to some suggestions otherwise, are insufficient to determine a marketing investment's competitive impact because they measure changes only in own-good demand, not in competitive demand. Nevertheless, I will show how to extend a decision-based analysis to competing goods by decomposing the elasticity of cross-good demand.
The objective of this article is to provide a clear and accurate method that attributes the growth in own-good demand to changes in: (1) consumers' decisions, (2) competitive demand, and (3) competitive market share. I will accomplish this by settling some confusion about what the decision-and share-based decompositions mean, by discussing how each of the decompositions relates to the others, and by discussing the research questions that each of the decompositions can answer. From the unit-based decomposition, a brand manager can learn whether the growth in own-good demand is due to stolen units. From the share-based decomposition, a manager can learn whether it is due to stolen market share. From the decision-based decomposition, a manager can learn which changes in consumer behavior lead to the growth in demand. Used together, these methods provide a comprehensive understand of a marketing investment's impact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, I derive the relationship between the unit-and share-based decompositions. Contrasting the two decompositions clarifies the perspective that each method offers and coerces a more precise interpretation of the share-based method. I illustrate the difference between the methods using an example based on the empirical results of Berndt et al. (1997) . In section three, I decompose the elasticity of cross-good demand to isolate the impact of each consumer decision on competitive demand. This analysis resolves the discrepancies in the coffee example of van Heerde et al. (2003) and clarifies the meaning of decisionbased decompositions. In section four, I derive the relationships between the decisionbased and the unit-and share-based decompositions using the previous cross-good analysis. This allows me to construct matrices that fully account for how a marketing action affects both consumers' decisions and the demand for and market-share of competing goods. I illustrate the unified decompositions by returning to the coffee example and discuss a paradox that can arise when the own-good market share is low. I conclude in section five. All of the decompositions that will be discussed measure an investment's contemporaneous effects.
Decompositions that Measure Competitive Impact
Let's begin by comparing the unit-and share-based approaches to studying a marketing action's competitive impact. Both methods attribute the growth in own-good demand to rivalrous and non-rivalrous sources. The unit-based method measures stolen business by the decrease in demand for competing goods whereas the share-based method measures stolen business by the decrease in their market share. Neither method requires a model of the consumers' decision-making process in order to make this judgment. I will show that both decompositions accurately depict how a marketing action would affect competing goods and will explain how to interpret differences in their results. 
Unit-Based Decompositions
Unit-based decompositions measure stolen business by the decrease in demand for competing goods. These decompositions are derived from the identity
Demand for the target good is expressed as the difference between demand for all goods in the market and demand for competing goods.
The impact of an incremental marketing investment is quantified by taking derivatives, such that
This equation attributes the growth in own-good demand to two sources. The non- 
The leading term all j Q q simply scales the change in market demand from being measured relative to the level of market demand to being measured relative to the level of demand for good j. Similarly, the leading term 1.5 Ψ = implies that an advertising investment that creates 100 units of demand for the target good also creates 50 units of demand for competing goods.
Share-Based Decompositions
Share-based decompositions measure stolen business by the decrease in market share of competing goods. These decompositions are derived from the identity
Demand for the target good is expressed as the product of market demand and the target good's market share.
The impact of an incremental marketing investment is quantified by applying the chain rule, such that
Equation (7) attributes the growth in own-good demand to two sources. The non- The conceptual hurdle is recognizing that the share-based measure of primary demand is not equivalent to the demand generated by market expansion. Under sharebased decompositions, marketing investments must create demand for competing goods in proportion to their market share in order to be considered non-rivalrous. This implies it is possible for marketing investments to create some demand for competing goods (investment spillover occurs), yet some of the growth in own-good demand is still classified as being stolen from them. While the concept of stolen market share is immediately understood, its implication on primary demand is more subtle. 
, and
< Insert Figure Two >
Expressed in terms of elasticities, the share-based decomposition is
The proportions
provide share-based measures of primary and secondary demand. These measures are related to those of the unit-based decomposition through the expressions share-preserving market market expansion, j expansion, j
stolen stolen market share, j units, j expansion, j
This relationship should be expected. Both decompositions attribute the growth in own-good demand to changes in demand for competing goods. The share-based decomposition, however, attributes the demand competing goods would earn in an expanded market if they kept their market share, market expansion, j j S − ⋅ Ψ , to the rivalrous source.
The unit-and share-based decompositions are simply different measures of competitive impact, and one can be recovered from the other without consideration of the consumers' decision-making process. All information needed to determine these decompositions is contained in the elasticities of own-and cross-good demand.
The following interpretation applies to share-based measures of primary and Berndt et al. (1995 Berndt et al. ( , 1997 study the growth and changing composition of the U.S.
Empirical Example -Berndt et al. (1997)
anti-ulcer drug market. Peptic ulcer disease occurs in 10-15 percent of the U.S. Berndt et al. (1995 Berndt et al. ( , 1997 ) estimate a system of two equations to describe consumer demand for these drugs. They specify a log-linear demand equation to describe the relationship between the market (industry) demand and the firms' marketing investments. They also specify a relative demand equation to describe the relationship between the firms' relative market shares and the relative investments made in support of their drugs. I will use Berndt et al.'s (1997) estimates from the two-product market that contains Tagamet and Zantac. 3 The elasticity of market demand is -0.268 for a change in the price of Tagamet and -0.804 for a change in the price of Zantac. The own-good elasticity of demand is -1.154 for Tagamet and is -1.690 for Zantac.
The share-and unit-based measures of primary and secondary demand are given in Table Two . The results of these methods provide very different impressions of whether price cuts steal business. Regardless of whether Tagamet or Zantac cuts its price, the unitbased measure suggests most of the growth in own-good demand comes from primary demand (92.9% for Tagamet and 63.4% for Zantac) whereas the share-based measure suggests most of the growth comes from secondary demand (76.8% for Tagamet and 52.4% for Zantac). share. Used in tandem, however, the measures provide the manager with a more complete understanding of whether the growth in Tagamet's demand has been stolen from Zantac.
< Insert

Decompositions that Measure Consumer Impact
Decision-based decompositions measure the relative influence of changes in consumers' decisions on the change in demand for goods. Gupta (1988) shows how to measure the influence of these decisions on own-good demand. I will extend his analysis to measure their influence on competitive and market demand.
Decision-Based Decompositions
Decision-based decompositions require a model of the consumers' decision-making process, so let's begin by specifying a traditional model. Assume own-good demand is the product of three decisions: whether to purchase (incidence), which good to purchase if a purchase is made (conditional choice), and how much to purchase if a particular good is chosen (conditional quantity). The expected demand for good j is
where N is the number of shopping occasions, u is the probability of buying in the category, j v is the probability of choosing good j conditional on buying in the category, and j w is the expected units purchased conditional on good j being chosen.
As has been shown (Gupta, 1988) , the elasticity of own-good demand is decomposed using the chain rule as , , , ,
, j u m η , , 
summarize the relationship and can be interpreted as follows: Of the growth in own-good demand, incidence, j m Λ % is generated by consumers buying more frequently in the category, own-good choice, j m Λ % is generated by consumers choosing the target good more frequently when they do buy in the category, and own-good quantity, j m Λ % is generated by consumers buying in greater amounts when they do choose the target good.
The influence of changes in consumers' decisions on the demand for competing goods can be quantified in a similar manner. The elasticity of demand for a single competing good is decomposed as , , , , 
Empirical Example -van Heerde et al. (2003)
Some confusion still remains about what Gupta's (1988) week for coffee. The probability of purchasing coffee on any of these occasions is 0.20, and the conditional probability of choosing Folgers given that coffee is purchased is 0.18.
The conditional quantity purchased is 1.0 unit, no matter which brand is chosen. The elasticity of purchase incidence is , 0.034 Applying similar reasoning to the target good, however, leads to a contradiction.
The sales of Folgers would increase by 7.6 units if the demand for coffee remained the same. But the demand for coffee would increase, and of the 7 additional purchase incidents, 21.8% would result in purchases of 1.004 units of Folgers, leading to an increase of 0.218 * 7 * 1.004 = 1.5 units. Thus, the change in sales of Folgers would be 7.6 + 1.5 = 9.1 units. 6 This result is problematic, however, because the comprehensive elasticity predicts that the demand for Folgers would grow by 0.248 * 36 = 8.9 units.
Van Heerde et al's (2003) reasoning is incorrect for two reasons. Gupta's (1988) decomposition predicts how the changes in consumers' decisions would affect only owngood demand, not competitive demand. Furthermore, when calculating the influence of any one decision on the growth in own-good demand, Gupta's decomposition holds the consumers' other decisions constant, but does not hold the market demand constant. The proper calculation is based on equation (14). The demand for Folgers would increase by 0.034 * 36 = 1.2 units due to consumers buying coffee more frequently, by 0.210 * 36 = 7.6 units due to consumers choosing Folgers more frequently when they do buy coffee, and by 0.004 * 36 = 0.1 units due to consumers buying coffee in greater amounts when they do buy Folgers. In total, the demand for Folgers would increase by 1.2 + 7.6 + 0.1 = 8.9 units due to the promotion, which reconciles with calculation based on the comprehensive elasticity.
Competitive demand must be decomposed in order to determine how the changes in consumers' decisions would influence the demand for other coffees. Using equation (21), the demand for other coffees would decrease by 0.210 * 36 = 7.6 units due to consumers choosing to buy Folgers more frequently when they do buy coffee. The switching offset would be zero in this example because the conditional purchase quantity is assumed to be the same for all goods ( 1 j w j = ∀ ). But the demand for other coffees would increase by 0.034 * 164 = 5.6 units due to consumers buying coffee more frequently. In total, the demand for other coffees would change by -7.6 + 5.6 = -2.0 units due to the promotion, not -2.2 units.
Due to this error, a number of the studies that van Heerde et al. (p.483,  Table 2) quote as having misinterpreted Gupta's findings actually interpret his findings correctly.
For example, they cite Chiang (1991, p. 309 ) who writes, "These results are similar to the ones obtained by Gupta (1998, p. 352) , where 84% of the increase is due to brand switching, 14% by purchase time acceleration, and 2% by increases in quantity."
Interpretations, like this one, that suggest Gupta's findings attribute the growth in owngood demand to changes in consumers' decisions are correct.
Other studies quoted by van Heerde et al. (2003) do misinterpret Gupta's findings.
For example, they cite Sethuraman and Srinivasan (2002, p.380 ) who write, "Gupta (1988) and Bell, Chiang and Padmanabhan (1999) show that promotions have a relatively small effect on category expansion compared with brand switching. Therefore, we isolate and study the profitability due to brand switching only." This conclusion cannot be drawn from Gupta's findings. Holding the consumers' other decisions constant, greater purchase frequency can lead to more growth in competitive demand than it would in own-good demand. (In the example, the demand for other coffees would grow by 5.6 units due to greater purchase frequency even though the demand for Folgers would grow only by 1.2 units.) Thus, the market expansion is not necessarily small simply because greater purchase frequency would create a small amount of own-good demand. Combining the decompositions, as will be done in section four, will make the difference between these two interpretations even more distinct.
Decompositions that Measure Both Consumer and Competitive Impact
It is possible to measure the consumer and competitive impact of a promotion at the same time. Unified decompositions quantify how a marketing action changes the consumers' decisions of whether, which, and how much to buy and how the change in each of these decisions affects the own-good, competitive, and market demand. I will show how the decision-based decomposition and unit-and share-based decompositions relate to each other and will return to the coffee example to discuss what can be learned from combining them.
Unifying Relationships
The relationship between the unit-and decision-based decompositions is found by substituting equation (20) into equation (4) and equation (21) The unit-based measures are functions of the decision-based measures and an additional term, the switching offset. The switching offset accounts for the change in demand due to consumers switching among goods that are conditionally purchased in different amounts.
The relationship between the share-and decision-based decompositions is found by substituting equation (20) into equation (9) and equation (21) into equation (10).
share-preserving incidence, own-good switching market expansion, quantity, offset,
stolen own-good own-good switching share, quantity, choice, offset,
The matrices provided in Table Three express the relationship between the consumer-and competitive-impact decompositions. Panel A depicts the relationship between the decision-and unit-based decompositions and Panel B depicts the relationship between the decision-and share-based decompositions. The cross-good elasticity decomposition is critical to this analysis because it quantifies how changes in each of the consumers' decisions influence competitive and market demand.
< Insert Table Three >
The matrices clarify how each of the decompositions accounts for changes in demand. First, it is interesting to note that the information contained in Gupta's (1988) decision-based decomposition is not sufficient to exactly determine the impact of a marketing action on the demand for competing goods. The switching offset needs to be determined in addition to the proportions given in equations (15) to (17) in order to calculate the competitive impact. This is not troubling, however, because the intent of his decomposition is to measure the relative influence of changes in each of the consumers' decision on the growth in own-good demand. An analysis of the impact on cross-good demand, which is required by the competitive-impact decompositions, is not necessary.
Second, strictly speaking, the measure of primary and secondary demand proposed by Bell et al. (1999) can be given neither a unit-nor a share-based interpretation. They define primary demand as the sum of the incidence and conditional own-good quantity proportions, incidence, Third, it is easy to determine why the general relationship between the decisionand unit-based decompositions is simpler in the special case that the conditional owngood purchase quantity is the same for all goods. Van Heerde et al. (2003) show that if
stolen incidence, choice on units, own-good,
These relationships hold because the market share of each good is equivalent to its conditional choice probability and the switching offset is zero in this special case. These 
Coffee Example Revisited
Let's revisit the coffee example to further illustrate the relationships between the decompositions. The changes in own-good and competitive demand due to each of the consumers' decisions were determined in section three. The change in market demand, which is also needed, can be constructively determined from equation (20). The demand for coffee would increase by 0.034 * 200 = 6.8 units due to consumers buying coffee more frequently and 0.004 * 36 = 0.1 units due to greater amounts of coffee being purchased when Folgers is chosen. The demand for coffee is unaffected by the consumers' conditional choice decision because the assumptions of the example set the conditional purchase quantities to be equal for all goods. Thus, demand for coffee increases by 6.8 + 0.1 = 6.9 units in total. All of the effects due to the promotion are accounted for in Table Four . Panel A provides the changes in demand by each of the consumers' decisions and Panel B depicts the total changes in demand and market shares.
< Insert Table Four >
We are now ready to address the questions that the Folger's brand manager would like to answer, "How will consumers respond and how will competing goods be affected if I choose to invest in feature-and-display advertising?"
The unit-and share-based decompositions measure different aspects of how the promotion affects competing goods. These decompositions depend solely on the total changes in demand for coffee, not on each of the consumers' decisions that give rise to these changes. From the unit-based decomposition, the brand manager learns that of the 8.9 unit growth in demand for Folgers, 77.5% (6.9 units) would be due to an expanded market for coffee and 22.5% (2.0 units) would be due to units being stolen from other coffees. This implies that other coffees would lose 2.0 units due to the promotion. From the share-based decomposition, the brand manager learns that of the 8.9 unit growth in demand for Folgers, 86.5% (7.7 units) would diminish the market share of other coffees.
The decision-based decomposition measures the influence of changes in consumers' decisions on the growth in demand for Folgers. From this decomposition, the brand manager learns that of the 8.9 unit growth in demand for Folgers, 13.5% (1.2 units)
would be due to consumers buying coffee more frequently, 85.4% (7.6 units) would be due to consumers choosing Folgers more frequently when they choose to buy coffee, and 1.1% (0.1 units) would be due to consumers purchasing coffee in greater amounts when they choose to buy Folgers. This analysis focuses solely on the growth in demand for Folgers, not on the changes in demand for other coffees.
The unified decompositions, summarized in Table Five , provide a more complete understanding of how the promotion works. It explains why both of the following statements are true: (1) most of the growth in demand for Folgers, 84.5%, is attributed to consumers switching away from other coffees when they choose to buy coffee, but also (2) most of the growth in demand for Folgers, 77.5%, is attributed to market expansion.
This paradox exists because, holding the consumers' other decisions constant, a greater frequency of coffee purchases would benefit each brand in proportion to its market share.
Folgers, which has a market share of 18%, would earn 1.2 units of the 6.8 unit increase in demand for coffee that is due to greater purchase frequency, but the other coffees would gain 5.6 units, about 4.5 times more. This paradox would not arise if Folgers dominated the market because it would benefit most from a greater frequency of coffee purchases.
< Insert Table Five >
Brand managers can use the unified decompositions to help them choose among marketing investments. For instance, suppose that the Folgers' brand manager is particularly concerned about the competitive response to her marketing action. Knowing that a small increase in the consumers' desire for coffee can mitigate much of the losses in competitive demand might persuade her to use an advertising slogan that reads, "Folgers -the best way to brighten your morning!" rather than one that reads "Folgersthe brightest tasting coffee!" It is an empirical question, of course, as to whether the former slogan entices more consumers to drink coffee in the morning. But the unified decompositions provide a means of testing how each of these marketing actions would change consumers' decisions, and, in turn, how the changes in each of these decisions influence own-good and competitive demand.
Conclusion
Marketing investments are designed to change consumer behavior in ways that help goods compete in the marketplace. Previous work has focused on how marketing investments affect either consumer decision making or how they affect competing goods.
Decision-based decompositions attribute the growth in own-good demand to changes in the consumers' decision-making process. Unit-and share-based decompositions, on the other hand, attribute the same growth to either rivalrous or non-rivalrous sources.
Combining the consumer and the competitive points of view in a single decomposition provides a more complete understanding of the marketing investment's impact, which should lead to better managerial decisions. All of the methods that were discussed in this article study a marketing investment's contemporaneous effects. Future work might focus on how the effects of an investment persist over time. 
